Life Of A Request

This page shows where data moves during a protected agent action.

Sequence

1. User or operator reaches a deployed control plane through an approved private access path.
2. Agent adapter prepares an action request.
3. Adapter calls ZT-Infra POST /actions before tool execution.
4. Policy returns allow or deny.
5. Deny stops execution immediately.
6. Allow enters an execution broker such as Docker Local or Nono.
7. Broker runs the approved command with constrained permissions.
8. Local audit record is hash-chained and signed.
9. Optional DAAL asynchronously anchors only the action hash or batch root.
10. Alchemy receipt verification confirms the transaction targets the DAAL contract.

Data Flow

StepComponentData InData Out
Identity and accessTailscale / SSMOperator or service access path.Private network or fallback session.
Policy checkZT-Infra control planeactor, action, resource, optional context.allow or deny, reason, audit envelope.
Execution brokerDocker Local / NonoAllowed action plus constrained command spec.Execution result or skipped execution.
Local auditProvisioner audit moduleDecision envelope.Hash-chained signed audit record.
DAAL sidecarCDP / Base transaction pathagentId, actionHash, optional metadata URI.Transaction hash or pending queue status.
VerificationAlchemy RPCTransaction hash.Receipt status and contract-address match.

What Does Not Leave The Control Plane

The DAAL path should not receive:

Only the derived hash is anchored. If metadata URIs are used later, they must point to access-controlled evidence objects or redacted summaries.

Failure Behavior

FailureExpected Behavior
Policy engine unavailableFail closed; protected action does not run.
Broker unavailablePolicy may allow, but execution fails with an operational error.
CDP unavailableLocal audit remains durable; DAAL status remains pending or failed; execution path is not blocked by ledger confirmation.
Alchemy unavailableReceipt verification is delayed; transaction hash can be reconciled later with another RPC provider.
thirdweb unavailableContract deployment or optional Engine write path is delayed; CDP direct mode can continue if configured.
Base congestionDAAL submission is delayed; local audit and retry queue remain the immediate evidence.

Security Value

This architecture gives a CTO three reviewable properties:

  1. Pre-execution control: sensitive agent actions are checked before they run.
  2. Constrained execution: allowed actions pass through a broker with explicit permissions.
  3. Independent evidence: local audit records can be checked against an external hash anchor.

The ledger attestation path is therefore a non-repudiation control, not an execution dependency.