Risk Register
This register tracks public adapter risks at a level useful for adopters and contributors. It avoids operational details, private timelines, and environment-specific attack paths.
| Risk | Impact | Likelihood | Current Control | Mitigation / Owner | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy bypass in an adapter | A sensitive tool executes without authorization. | Medium | ZeroTrustClient.guardedCall(...), adapter tests, deny-before-execute docs. | Add conformance tests for every new adapter surface. Owner: maintainer. | Open |
| Actor spoofing in mock control plane | A local demo actor can claim another identity. | High in mock, low production claim | Mock docs label this as onboarding-only. | Extend service identity with workload-bound actor binding. Owner: maintainer + contributors. | Planned |
| Performance overhead from control-plane checks | Agent workflows become too slow for adoption. | Medium | Local checks are lightweight; DAAL is explicitly asynchronous and does not wait for ledger confirmation. | Add latency benchmarks and target p95 decision overhead. Owner: maintainer. | Open |
| Audit hash-chain mismatch | Evidence cannot be verified after tampering or serialization drift. | Medium | zt-audit verify tests canonical hash consistency. | Publish machine-readable audit schema and golden fixtures. Owner: maintainer. | Open |
| KMS or DAAL outage | Evidence sink is delayed or unavailable. | Medium | Local audit is written first; DAAL is queued asynchronously with pending, verified, and failed states. | Add retry/dead-letter metrics and reconciliation alerts. Owner: platform engineer. | Planned |
| Broker isolation weakness | Approved action exceeds expected runtime permissions. | Low in public repo, deployment-dependent in production | Public repo frames brokers as execution layers inside defense in depth. | Document broker assumptions and add runtime-specific hardening tests. Owner: broker contributor. | Planned |
| Secret exposure in examples or docs | Cloud keys, wallet keys, or API tokens leak publicly. | Medium | .gitignore, SECURITY.md, local secret scanner, GitHub secret scanning guidance. | Keep CI secret scan and GitHub push protection enabled. Owner: maintainer. | Active |
| Overclaiming decentralized audit | Market trust is damaged by claims beyond implementation. | Medium | Explorer and enterprise-readiness docs define approved claims and claim boundaries. | Keep the public claim to hash anchoring and non-repudiation until production reconciliation evidence exists. Owner: maintainer. | Active |
| Vendor lock-in concern | Enterprise reviewers assume the ledger path depends on one provider. | Medium | DAAL uses EVM-compatible contract calls and records transaction hashes, not proprietary provider objects. | Maintain provider portability docs for RPC, signer, and deployment tooling. Owner: maintainer. | Active |
| Unclear ownership during incident | Public vulnerability response stalls. | Medium | SECURITY.md has reporting SLA. | Use incident response playbook and war-room roles. Owner: project lead. | Active |
| Contributor confusion between mock and production | Users assume the local mock is the production control plane. | Medium | Current vs Planned banner and Phase 1 ready criteria. | Keep mock labels in README, website, and docs. Owner: docs maintainer. | Active |
Review Cadence
Review this register before each tagged release and whenever a new broker, adapter surface, or audit sink is added.